The Defendants
The IWF Team of Attorneys is presently investigating and filing cases that target the Iranian Terrorist Network that systematically waged a years-long campaign of violence against Coalition Forces in Iraq between 2003 -2011. The Defendants in these cases consist of the key components of the Terror Network, including Iranian banks, state-owned businesses, government agencies and the state of Iran. Specifically, the Defendants are:
1. The Islamic Republic of Iran
2. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
3. The Iranian Ministry of Intelligence & Security
4. The Central Bank of Iran
5. Bank Melli Iran
6. The National Iranian Oil Company
The Islamic Republic Of Iran
The Islamic Republic of Iran is a foreign state as defined by the defined Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, and is designated a State Sponsor of Terrorism pursuant to the Export Administration Act of 1979.
Normally, Foreign States and their political subdivisions and agencies are immune from lawsuits. However, certain exceptions to their immunity exist, including in engaging in or materially supporting terrorism.
From at least 2003 to 2011, Iran directed, planned and authorized acts of torture, extrajudicial killing, and hostage-taking, and provided material support or resources to Hezbollah, The Special Groups, Ansar al Islam, Al Qaida, and other terrorists that perpetrated the terrorist attacks and specifically for the purpose of carrying out those attacks throughout Iraq. Iran’s actions were directly targeted at Coalition Forces and Iraq citizens, and these acts can be reasonably connected to the murders, kidnappings and injuries to many U.S, Service Members and Contractors.
Iranian material support and resources used in the commission of acts of extrajudicial killing, torture and/or hostage-taking within the meaning of Sovereign Immunities in Iraq from 2003-2011 has been attributed to at least 600 deaths of American soldiers.
The Government of Iran is politically and ideologically hostile to the United States and its allies, and has consistently provided material support for acts of international terrorism, including extrajudicial killings, torture, and hostage-takings, particularly through its political divisions and agencies that include the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, Qods Forces, and their Foreign Terrorist Organization proxies Hezbollah, Al Qaida, Ansar Islam, and others.
Iran provided funds, training, arms, equipment, and other material support to these groups in Iraq for the sole purpose of carrying out terrorist attacks against Coalition Forces and Contractors.
ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS (IRGC)
The IRGC was founded in the wake of the 1979 revolution as a branch of the Iranian Armed Forces tasked with protecting the country’s Islamic system. Since its origin as an ideologically driven militia, the IRGC has taken an ever more assertive role in virtually every aspect of Iranian society. The IRGC is a special entity unto itself, part military force, part paramilitary force, and part business conglomerate. IRGC operates under the direct supervision of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei.
The IRGC is nominally comprised of five branches (Ground Forces, Air Force, Navy, Basij militia, and Qods Force special operations IRGC-QF) in addition to a counterintelligence directorate and representatives of the Supreme Leader.
In 2019, the IRGC was designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the U.S. Government, and several of the IRGC’s leaders have been sanctioned under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1747.
The IRGC is now a vast conglomerate. It controls Iran’s missile batteries, its nuclear program, and a business empire.
Even before the U.S. liberation of Iraq in 2003, the IRGC had long cultivated ties to Shi’a opposition groups opposed to Saddam Hussein’s brutal regime, including the Badr Corps that was headquartered in Iran in the 1980s and the 1990s. The IRGC has also infiltrated Iraqi society, providing “political and ideological support” via charitable associations such as the Khomeini Social Help Committee – in Karbala, Najaf, Kut, and Sadr City – and the Imam Mohammad Bagher Institute in Najaf.
According to the U.S. State Department’s 2005 Country Reports on Terrorism: “[t]he IRGC was increasingly involved in supplying lethal assistance to Iraqi militant groups, which destabilizes Iraq ... Senior Iraqi officials have publicly expressed concern over Iranian interference in Iraq, and there were reports that Iran provided funding, safe passage, and arms to insurgent elements.”
The IRGC-QF’s “Department 2000” manages Iran’s relationship with Hezbollah, which includes the flow of some of Iran’s most sophisticated weapon systems, including military-grade EFPs, anti-tank guided missiles, and various rockets, such as the Fajr-5.
These weapons were used to kill and maim U.S. Soldiers and Contractors in Iraq.
The Iranian ministry of intelligence & Security (MOIS)
MOIS is the most powerful and well-supported ministry among all Iranian ministries in terms of logistics, finances, and political support. It is a governmental organization that operates both inside and outside of Iran.
MOIS functions as the Iranian Intelligence Service and, in this capacity, it is the secret police and primary intelligence agency of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It is the part of the Iranian government's security apparatus responsible for the assassination of Iranian political dissidents inside and outside the country.
MOIS has been involved in kidnappings, assassinations, and terrorism since its inception in 1985. Many of the U.S. State Department reports on global terrorism over the last twenty-five years refer to MOIS as Iran’s key facilitator and director of terrorist attacks.
MOIS and its agents have routinely been, and are presently designated by the U.S. Treasury as a Specially Designated Nation (SDN) and Specially Designated Global Terrorist, pursuant to the U.S. Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations.
MOIS uses all means at its disposal to protect the Islamic Revolution of Iran, utilizing such methods as infiltrating internal opposition groups, monitoring domestic threats and expatriate dissent, arresting alleged spies and dissidents, exposing conspiracies deemed threatening, and maintaining liaison with other foreign intelligence agencies as well as with organizations that protect the Islamic Republic’s interests around the world.
MOIS operates under the direct supervision of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, who claims to be the leader of the Muslim world. As noted above, MOIS agents are known as “Unknown Soldiers of Imam Zaman,” who is the Twelfth Imam in the succession of Islamic leaders of Shi’a Muslims. However, the organization is not bound by Shi’a beliefs. To advance its goals, MOIS recruits individuals regardless of their beliefs.
MOIS and the IRGC-QF coordinate through foreign embassies, “charities,” and cultural centers in targeted countries.
In 1995 and again in 1996, Usama Bin Laden approached MOIS and asked to join forces against the United States. Bin Laden’s phone records, obtained by U.S. investigators working on the U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, show that 10 percent of phone calls made by Bin Laden and his lieutenants were to Iran. Seif al-Adl, one of Al Qaida’s top-ranking leaders at the time, was the liaison between Iranians and AQ; he coordinated meetings with the IRGC’s leaders and MOIS officials.
FTO Hezbollah is also organizationally linked to MOIS and is used by MOIS as a proxy in Iran’s intelligence operations. In the Middle East, Iran, through MOIS and the IRGC-QF, used Hezbollah to attack the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan by backing insurgent groups.
Specifically, MOIS acted as a conduit for Iran's provision of funds, training, and direction to terrorists for their activities beyond the borders of Iran including the actions relating to attacks that targeted Coalition Forces in Iraq.
Bank markazi jomhouri islami iran
Following the Iranian Revolution in 1979, all banks in Iran were nationalized and are effectively controlled by the Iranian regime.
Bank Markazi Jomhouri Islami Iran is the Central Bank of Iran. The Central Bank of Iran (“CBI”) has provided millions of dollars to terrorist organizations directly and via other Iranian-owned and controlled banks. For example, in a press release issued by the U.S. Treasury Department in 2007 regarding the designation of the Iranian-owned Bank Saderat as an SDGT, the U.S. Government noted that Bank Saderat transferred $50 million from the Central Bank of Iran through its subsidiary in London to its branch in Beirut for the benefit of Hezbollah fronts in Lebanon that support acts of violence.
According to the United States’ Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) the Central Bank of Iran assisted designated Iranian banks by transferring billions of dollars to these banks in 2011. In mid-2011, the CBI transferred several billion dollars to designated banks, including Saderat, Mellat, EDBI, and Melli, through a variety of payment schemes. In making these transfers, the CBI attempted to evade U.S counter-terrorism financing sanctions by minimizing the direct involvement of large international banks with both CBI and designated Iranian banks.
Bank melli Iran
Bank Melli Iran is one of the largest banks in Iran and is entirely controlled by the Iranian Regime.
According to the U.S. government, from 2004-2011, Bank Melli Iran and Melli Bank Plc in London transferred approximately $100 million to the IRGC-QF, which trained, armed, and funded terrorist groups that targeted and killed and maimed American and Iraqi forces and civilians.
Specifically, according to the U.S. government, the IRGC and IRGC-Qods Force, who channel funds to militant groups that target and kill Coalition and Iraqi forces and innocent Iraqi civilians, have used Bank Melli and other Iranian banks to move funds internationally. Bank Melli used deceptive banking practices to obscure its involvement from the international banking system by requesting that its name be removed from financial transactions when handling financial transactions on behalf of the IRGC.
In October 2007 and throughout the remainder of the relevant period, Bank Melli Iran and Melli Bank Plc were each designated as a SDN pursuant to Executive Order (“E.O.”) 13382 and included on the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s SDN list.
The U.S. Treasury Department press release announcing the SDN designation stated: Bank Melli also provides banking services to the [Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps] and the Qods Force. Entities owned or controlled by the IRGC or the Qods Force use Bank Melli for a variety of financial services. From 2002 to 2006, Bank Melli was used to send at least $100 million to the Qods Force. When handling financial transactions on behalf of the IRGC, Bank Melli has employed deceptive banking practices to obscure its involvement from the international banking system. For example, Bank Melli has requested that its name be removed from financial transactions.
A State Department diplomatic cable from March 2008 noted that, “Bank Melli and the Central Bank of Iran also provide crucial banking services to the Qods Force, the IRGC’s terrorist-supporting arm that was headed by UNSCR 1747 designee Commander Ghassem Soleimani. Soleimani’s Qods Force leads Iranian support for the Taliban, Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad
U.S. government in a November 10, 2009, in another diplomatic cable, stated that the “Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and IRGC-Qods Force, who channel funds to militant groups that target and kill Coalition and Iraqi forces and innocent Iraqi civilians, have used Bank Melli and other Iranian banks to move funds internationally.”
During 2033 -2011, Bank Melli Iran financed transactions that purposefully evaded U.S. sanctions on behalf of Mahan Air (an SDGT) and Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics. For example, Bank Melli issued a Letter of Credit to Mahan Airlines (an Iranian airline) in August 2004 to help Mahan Airlines illegally acquire aircraft engines subject to the U.S. embargo.
Bank Melli’s financial support and assistance to Mahan Airlines is particularly significant because on October 12, 2011, the United States designated Mahan Air as an SDGT for “providing financial, material and technological support to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF). Based in Tehran, Mahan Airlines provides transportation, funds transfers and personnel travel services to the IRGC-QF.” The U.S. Treasury Department explained Mahan Airline’s direct involvement with terrorist operations, personnel movements and logistics on the IRGC-QF’s behalf, “Mahan Air [has] facilitated the covert travel of suspected IRGC-QF officers into and out of Iraq by bypassing normal security procedures and not including information on flight manifests to eliminate records of the IRGC-QF travel… Mahan Air also provides transportation services to Hezbollah, a Lebanon-based designated Foreign Terrorist Organization. Mahan Air has transported personnel, weapons, and goods on behalf of Hezbollah and omitted from Mahan Air cargo manifests secret weapons shipments bound for Hezbollah.”
Mahan Airlines was also later identified as the conduit to Iran of thousands of radio frequency modules that were ultimately recovered by Coalition Forces in Iraq from IEDs and EFPs that were used to target Iraqi civilians, U.S. soldiers, and Coalition Forces.
National Iranian oil company
The National Iranian Oil Company (“NIOC”), owned and overseen by the Government of Iran through its Ministry of Petroleum, is responsible for the exploration, production, refining, and export of oil and petroleum products in Iran.
Pursuant to E.O. 13382, the U.S. Government designated NIOC as an SDN. The U.S. Government has identified NIOC as an agent or affiliate of the IRGC.
In September 2012, the U.S. Treasury Department handed its report to Congress regarding its determination that NIOC is an agent or affiliate of the IRGC. The report provided that: Recently, the IRGC has been coordinating a campaign to sell Iranian oil in an effort to evade international sanctions, specifically those imposed by the European Union that prohibit the import, shipping, and purchase of Iranian oil, which went into full effect on July 1, 2012. NIOC, which is owned by the Government of Iran through the Ministry of Petroleum, is responsible for the exploration, production, refining, and export of oil and petroleum products in Iran.
Under the current Iranian regime, the IRGC’s influence has grown within National Iranian Oil Co. For example, on August 3, 2011, Iran’s parliament approved the appointment of Rostam Qasemi, a Brigadier General in the IRGC, as Minister of Petroleum. Prior to his appointment, Qasemi was the commander of Khatam Al-Anbia, a construction and development wing of the IRGC that generates income and funds operations for the IRGC. Even in his new role as Minister of Petroleum, Qasemi has publicly stated his allegiance to the IRGC.
As the IRGC has become increasingly influential in Iran's energy sector, Khatam Al-Anbiya has obtained billions of dollars’ worth of contracts with Iranian energy companies, including NIOC, often without participating in a competitive bidding process.
Under the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (“ITRSHRA”), the U.S. government determined that that NIOC is an agent or affiliate of the IRGC and that NIOC and the National Iranian Tanker Company are not only owned and controlled by the Government of Iran but that those companies provide significant support to the IRGC and its affiliates.
NIOC used its oil and natural gas business to launder money for the IRGC, often using the Central Bank of Iran for this purpose.
In 2009, West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center published a report on the role of NIOC, particularly in the Maysan province in Iraq (Southeast border between Iran and Iraq), and its role in studying U.S. troops movements. According to the report, “the establishment of a new U.S. and Iraqi [Forward Operating Base] on the Iranian border has resulted in three waves of attacks in an area that was formerly devoid of incidents. The incident occurred in the same district as the February 2007 EFP attack on a British aircraft at a Buzurgan dirt airstrip, itself a reaction by Special Groups to UK long-range patrolling of the Iranian border. This part of the border is increasingly the scene of U.S. and Iranian countermoves to support their proxies and patrol the frontier; Iranian intelligence gathering takes place using NIOC helicopters and border guards.”